



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PERSONAL ATTENTION

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SAC LEG NO. 54-37

*File Copies*

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

July 20, 1954

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(A) ~~NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL~~ -- The 1953 Convention of the Association was held at Sylvan Lake, South Dakota, and at the Convention a number of State Attorneys General made derogatory comments concerning the Bureau. It is the Bureau's wish to avoid any unpleasantness at the next Convention which will be held commencing December 8, 1954, at the Edgewater Gulf Hotel, Edgewater Park, Mississippi. The current President of the Association is Attorney General Eugene Cook of Georgia, who is well known to SAC Hawkins of the Atlanta Office. The attitude of the organization may be summed up in the fact that for the first time the Attorney General of the United States is not being invited to the National Convention due presumably to his stand on racial segregation matters. The Bureau has not decided whether there will be a Bureau representative in attendance at the Convention. So far no invitation has been received for a Bureau representative to attend.

The best way to avoid any possible criticism arising concerning the FBI is for each SAC to make certain that he knows personally each State Attorney General and has met with that State Attorney General sufficiently to ascertain whether that Attorney General has any complaint whatsoever concerning the FBI. It has been found in the past that the complaints were based for the most part on a misconception of the Bureau's organization, functions and jurisdiction. I shall hold you personally responsible for any misunderstanding on the part of a State Attorney General located within your field division. If adequate liaison does not now exist, you should establish same immediately. You should, prior to September 1, 1954, arrange to meet personally with each State Attorney General in your territory. You should ascertain whether he has any complaint of any type relating to the FBI. If so, you should straighten out the matter promptly. Even though you fully resolve the situation, an appropriate memorandum should be submitted to the Bureau. In the event of excellent relations and a complete absence of any complaint, you are to certify the same by memorandum to be received at the Bureau by September 1, 1954, marked for Attention Training and Inspection Division.

It further seems advisable for you to prepare an administrative tickler to arrange a follow-up contact during late November or in early December prior to the Convention. This matter is to be handled by you personally and should not be delegated to any subordinate employee.

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COMM - FBI

JUL 21 1954

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CLASS. BY

DATE OF REVIEW

68 JUL 29 1954

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY 404092/100  
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66-6200 100 ✓  
66-6200 65 ✓  
66-6700-105 ✓

W. 100-3-84-✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(B) ~~X~~ SUPERVISION BY SAC -- I desire to reiterate the necessity of each Special Agent in Charge and Assistant Special Agent in Charge keeping well informed of the operations of his office and keeping in intimate touch with investigative matters and the manner in which the supervisory staff is functioning.

In major cases, the Special Agent in Charge is expected to personally follow all details and he should be on the alert in major cases to scrutinize the various investigative steps, procedures and developments and be quick to seize upon defects and utilize them as a means of calling to the attention of personnel assigned to his office their weaknesses, mistakes and derelictions.

Obviously, in a major case, the Special Agent in Charge will be expected to be conversant with the contents of the principal investigative reports and the file in such cases. As a matter of fact, it is difficult for me to understand how any Special Agent in Charge can adequately supervise the work of his office without reviewing investigative reports, particularly in major cases, and without personally checking on the file from time to time. With the volume of work being handled throughout the Bureau, it is obviously impossible for a Special Agent in Charge to review all investigative reports emanating from his office; however, each Special Agent in Charge, and certainly each Assistant Special Agent in Charge, should review investigative reports in the major cases.

It is felt that if from time to time, as major cases arise, the Special Agent in Charge and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge can give their personal attention to the developments in the case, it will be possible for them to spot weaknesses as they are developing and take corrective action.

(C) ~~X~~ INSPECTIONS -- The Bureau is discontinuing its past policy of sending standby notices for Agents to be prepared to assist in future inspection assignments. In the future, you will receive a confidential teletype advising that a named Agent should depart immediately on inspection assignment and generally the teletype will require his presence in the office to be inspected on the following day. Whenever possible the Bureau will name an alternate Agent so that if one Agent is unavailable the alternate can be substituted. There should be no substitution of Agents not named in the Bureau teletype without prior Bureau clearance. You should take care to see that those Agents who are active Inspector Aides have equal opportunity to share in inspection assignments during the course of each calendar year. For your information, the Bureau has prepared a list of those

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Inspector Aides who have not been used this calendar year and they will be shortly ordered to assist on inspection assignments. The Bureau is particularly anxious to have field supervisors who are approved Aides get the benefit of inspection experience.

When you receive a teletype that an Agent should assist in an inspection assignment, the Agent should be promptly notified. The office to be inspected is to be retained in confidence and you are forbidden to permit the release of such information to unauthorized persons.

(D) ~~\*APPLICANT MATTERS - CLERICAL APPLICANTS FIELD~~ -- Your attention is directed to SAC Letter 54-33 (H) in which you were advised that no applicant was to be considered for Bureau employment unless he was at least 18 years of age or approaching his 18th birthday and would be 18 prior to his entry on duty at the Seat of Government. Effective immediately the same instructions apply to clerical applicants being considered for positions in the field.

In connection with those who might be presently under active consideration, there is no objection to completing the processing of their applications and should they be found to be entirely qualified the Bureau will give authority to place them on your eligible list, subject to approval for appointive action when they become 18 years of age. Furthermore, it might be advisable to contact those applicants falling within this category to inform them that they cannot be considered for appointive action until they reach their 18th birthday.

(E) ~~"THE WORKER IN THE SOVIET UNION"~~ (D)u Captioned monograph was prepared by the Central Research Unit at the request of the Field for use in the interview program currently in progress to develop additional security informants. It reviews the history of the trade union movement in the Soviet Union and describes the current status of the average Soviet Worker (G)u

While the monograph as a whole bears the classification ~~"Confidential"~~, since it represents a Bureau analysis of a matter which, strictly speaking, is not within our jurisdiction, all the material contained therein was obtained from public sources. It will be noted that the only use made of the book "Soviet Trade Unions" by Isaac Deutscher was the inclusion in the monograph of various official Soviet pronouncements which were readily available from this source. (G)u

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Information received from a reliable outside source indicates that Deutscher was a member of the Polish Communist Party during the 1930's until his expulsion in 1939 for Trotskyism. This outside source has commented that Deutscher cannot be described as sincerely anti-Communist and is a political opportunist who would be willing to change his political sympathies to suit his own purposes. Since World War II Deutscher has resided in England and is the author of biographies of both Stalin and Trotsky as well as a number of articles on Communism which have been published in non-Communist periodicals both in the United States and England. (C)u

This monograph should be added to your Field Office Library and afforded adequate security in accordance with existing regulations.

Two copies of this monograph are being furnished the Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Newark, New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle and Washington Field Offices. All other Offices are being furnished one copy.

(F) ~~\*APPLICANT MATTERS - \*CLERICAL RECRUITMENT - \*SEAT OF GOVERNMENT~~  
WEEKLY STATISTICAL SUMMARY -- In connection with the weekly statistical summary submitted to the Bureau setting forth information regarding the recruitment of clerical personnel for the Seat of Government, you are advised that the submission of this summary may be discontinued until such time as the Bureau instructs that the submission of it be resumed.

These instructions do not apply to the Special Agent applicant recruiting program and in this connection it is desired that the efforts of the field be intensified so that the Bureau's quota of Special Agents will be reached at the earliest possible date.

(G) ~~\*CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT - \*DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS~~ -- The request of the Civil Aeronautics Administration that FBI investigative reports be disseminated by our offices in the field directly to the Civil Aeronautics Administration Regional Attorneys in the field has been approved by the Bureau.

Hereafter, the office of origin in an investigation involving Civil Aeronautics Act violation is instructed to disseminate one copy of each FBI investigative report to the office of the CAA Regional Attorney that has jurisdiction in the area where the alleged

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violation occurred. Auxiliary offices in future investigations involving Civil Aeronautics Act will submit to the office of origin one copy of their investigative report designated for CAA Regional Attorney (CAA Reg. Atty). It is the responsibility of the office of origin to disseminate Civil Aeronautics Act investigative reports to the CAA Regional Attorney having jurisdiction over the location of the alleged offense. This does not change the requirement relative to submission of a copy of the investigative report relative to Civil Aeronautics Act violations to the interested United States Attorney.

There are five Civil Aeronautics Administration regional offices. For your guidance in disseminating Civil Aeronautics Administration reports in the field, there is set forth hereafter a list of the addresses of the Civil Aeronautics Administration Regional Attorneys listing the states within the respective Civil Aeronautics Administration's Division.

Regional Attorneys

REGION 1

Mr. [REDACTED]  
Regional Attorney  
Civil Aeronautics Administration  
Federal Building  
N.Y. International Airport  
Jamaica, New York

b6  
b7C

Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Maine,  
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,  
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,  
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West  
Virginia

REGION 2

Mr. [REDACTED]  
Regional Attorney  
Civil Aeronautics Administration  
P.O. Box 1689  
Fort Worth 1, Texas

b6  
b7C

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,  
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,  
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,  
Texas

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REGION 3

Mr. [REDACTED]  
Regional Attorney  
Civil Aeronautics Administration  
Federal Office Building  
911 Walnut Street  
Kansas City 6, Missouri

Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,  
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,  
North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin

REGION 4

Mr. [REDACTED]  
Regional Attorney  
Civil Aeronautics Administration  
5651 Manchester Avenue  
Los Angeles 45, California

Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,  
Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon,  
Utah, Washington, Wyoming

REGION 5

Mr. [REDACTED]  
Regional Attorney  
Civil Aeronautics Administration  
P.O. Box 440  
Anchorage, Alaska

Territory of Alaska including the  
Aleutian Islands.

Appropriate Manual of Instructions changes will be furnished  
the field in the near future.

(H) ~~EXHIBIT ENVELOPES - INTEROFFICE TRANSMISSION OF EVIDENCE AND~~  
EXHIBITS -- Under current practice, when a field office wishes to  
transmit documentary evidence to another office, the exhibits are  
removed from the small white exhibit envelope usually contained in  
the 1A envelope and the exhibits are put in a new envelope for  
transmission. It appears that streamlining can be effected by  
transmitting the small white exhibit envelope intact to the new  
office; however, the small white exhibit envelope should be carefully  
checked to make certain that it is intact and then it should be  
placed, unsealed, in a larger envelope which is to be carried as an

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enclosure to the document of transmittal. This enclosure should show the file number of the sending and receiving office, the case title, the character, and a very brief description of what is contained in the enclosure.

Upon receipt of the exhibit in the new office, the outer envelope should be removed and the original small white exhibit envelope can be appropriately marked for retention in the 1A exhibit envelope in the new office. Of course, the 1A exhibit envelope in the old office will contain an appropriate notation as to what disposition was made of the exhibit. Special care should be used by the transmitting office to make certain that the small white exhibit envelope is intact and that the exhibit is properly enclosed. This will make it unnecessary in the future to prepare a new white exhibit envelope containing the details as to who obtained the exhibit, when, whether it is to be returned, and a description of the exhibit. Time will undoubtedly be saved.

(I) ~~TRAINING - POLICE - MANUSCRIPTS~~ -- It has come to the attention of the Bureau that some police instructors maintain in their personal custody manuscripts which they use as the basis for presentation of a particular subject when assigned to instruct at a field police school. However, no copy of such material is available in the field office files.

Your attention has previously been directed to the necessity for reviewing prior schedules of schools when a request for an additional school is received from the same department in order to avoid stereotyped programs of training. To insure progression and variety in presentation, the subject matter content of previous lectures should also be reviewed. Therefore it is imperative that copies of all manuscripts on which lectures before police schools are based be available in field office police training reference files.

You should discuss this matter with police instructors of your office and make certain that copies of all material used as a basis for instruction in police schools by them are maintained in the files of your office so that these manuscripts can be reviewed in connection with the planning of a program of training for a particular department.

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In addition, it is desired that whenever a manuscript on a new subject is prepared in your office in response to a request for that subject in a school three copies of the new manuscript should be furnished to the Bureau for the attention of the Training and Inspection Division.

(J) ~~BULKY EXHIBITS~~ -- For your information it has come to the Bureau's attention that certain field offices have in the past with regard to documentary bulky exhibits followed a procedure of putting a green sheet in a cellophane envelope fastened to the outside of a red rope folder.

An experiment was tried in one of the largest offices to see if the cellophane envelope could be eliminated inasmuch as these cost fourteen cents each. The field office put a copy of the green sheet in a manila envelope which was placed inside the bulky exhibit red rope folder as the first item and the outside of the folder was marked to reflect the file and exhibit numbers; for example, 100-3689, 1A121-139. The net result has been a considerable savings through the elimination of the cellophane envelope without causing any unnecessary expenditure for materials or effort in the handling of bulky exhibits.

You should make certain that you follow this thinking insofar as is practical in the handling of your documentary bulky exhibits.

(K) ~~CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF FBI WORK~~ -- The Bureau has repeatedly emphasized the importance of zealously guarding information contained in Bureau files and preventing unauthorized persons from obtaining any information whatsoever as to the results of the Bureau's investigative work, administrative operations, personnel actions, or any other phase of FBI undertaking.

It appears that FBI employees are frequently careless about discussing FBI matters with former employees. Former employees are in exactly the same status as any other citizen who is not currently on the FBI payroll. Any administrative action taken, transfers ordered, revisions in work assignments, movement of FBI employees, case loads existing, resignations accepted, and related topics, are among those which are not considered proper for discussion with outsiders and should not be discussed with former employees. Many former employees have a strong interest in FBI operations and this is

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acquainting employees with weaknesses discovered in the recent past, so that those weaknesses can be used as a reminder to employees to avoid such performance in the future. Consequently, the Bureau is desirous of your scheduling at the next semiannual conference for investigative employees and again at the next semiannual conference for noninvestigative employees, an appropriate presentation to be handled by you personally, concerning the Bureau's disciplinary program. Without mentioning the names of individual employees, you should point out weaknesses detected and penalties imposed for those weaknesses during the past six months in your field division. This matter should be handled in a constructive fashion and you should use good judgment in presenting the weaknesses, bearing in mind that there may be a few which should not be made the topic of a widespread presentation.

If properly handled by you, this program can be most beneficial, and I want you to make certain that employees feel that they have an active responsibility in helping to preserve the reputation, integrity, and efficiency of the FBI.

(M) ~~U. S. ATTORNEYS~~ ~~REPORT WRITING~~ -- SAC Letter No. 53-19, dated March 10, 1953, instructs that Special Agents in Charge call upon new U. S. Attorneys relative to briefing them regarding the facilities and jurisdiction of the FBI.

Recently, a U. S. Attorney, who assumed duties as of January, 1954, by letter, unjustifiably criticized one of our field offices for not submitting reports on a more expeditious basis following the authorization of prosecution. A check in the office involved reflected that in eighty-nine per cent of the cases presented to this U. S. Attorney, there were investigative leads outstanding following the presentment of these cases. Obviously, the U. S. Attorney in question had not been sufficiently briefed as to the manner in which FBI reports are submitted to the various U. S. Attorneys.

The Bureau quite naturally expects to offer full cooperation to all U. S. Attorneys. We are more than glad to fulfill our responsibilities by submitting reports to U. S. Attorneys in all matters of mutual interest. It is not expected, however, that any U. S. Attorney will expect an office to submit unnecessary or incomplete reports in all cases prior to the logical conclusion of an investigation. In detailed or complicated cases, we naturally submit

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reports to the U. S. Attorney's Office at regular intervals, whether specifically requested to do so or not.

From the above, you can readily understand that we should include in our initial discussion with new U. S. Attorneys the facts surrounding submission of FBI reports. You should make certain there is no misunderstanding in any U. S. Attorney's mind relative to this matter.

(N) ~~TELETYPE~~ ~~CODED~~ ~~7~~ ~~4~~ ~~u~~ transmitting fully coded teletypes, the code groups should be transmitted 10 to the line in blocks of 5 lines with double spacing between each line within a block and two double spaces between blocks ~~4~~ ~~u~~

(O) ~~BUREAU WAR PLANS~~ ~~7~~ ~~4~~ ~~u~~  
A. MEDICAL SUPPLIES:

In connection with the maintenance of a reserve supply of medicines and other first-aid needs, it is desired that you consider the estimated life and potency of certain such items at all times. The following items, which it is understood have a life potency of one year, should be replaced every six months and used to fill the daily needs of your office. Surplus items shall be destroyed after one year. Reorders for new supplies should be placed in advance of the time when the six months' replenishing period occurs.

1. Burn compound (tubes)
2. Compresses, adhesive 1"
3. Plaster, adhesive 1", 2", and 3"
4. Hydrogen peroxide (remove every two months)

B. AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIES: ~~7~~ ~~4~~ ~~u~~

Your attention is invited to SAC Letter 33, Item (C), dated April 5, 1952, regarding WAR PLANS, concerning instructions to the effect that it is not necessary to keep on hand excessive reserves of tires, tubes, batteries, etc., when assurance can be obtained from competent local dealers that all items which have shelf-age factors can be obtained expeditiously in an emergency. It is expected that you will again survey your war plans in this respect and take whatever corrective steps necessary to comply with Bureau instructions. ~~4~~ ~~u~~

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(P) ~~COMMUNICATIONS~~ - USE OF ~~"PERSONAL ATTENTION"~~ OR ~~"PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL"~~ -- Reference is made to SAC Letter No. 54-23, Section (H) dated May 4, 1954, in which the use of the phrases "Personal and Confidential" and "Personal Attention" was discussed. As you are no doubt aware, the use of such phrases restricts the opening of the envelope under present existing regulations at the Bureau and you must make absolutely certain that if these phrases are used that a good and valid reason exists for such use. It is necessary that much of this mail containing restricted classifications be opened in my office. It has been ascertained that a considerable percentage of such mail should not be so captioned and it will be necessary that the use of these phrases be carefully analyzed and restricted in the future. In certain cases it is necessary that the outgoing communication from the Bureau bear such restricted captions but an analysis will reflect that a similar reason does not exist for captioning the return reply to the Bureau. It will be necessary that you afford this matter your personal attention to insure that a proper use is made of these respective captions in the future.

(Q) ~~LATENT FINGERPRINTS~~ - DEVELOPMENT OF -- As a result of the application of a new method of developing latent fingerprints on documents, it is now possible to develop prints many years old. The previous methods using iodine fumes and silver nitrate were often unsuccessful where the fingerprints were more than a matter of months old. These last two methods are still superior for recent prints.

This new method, the ninhydrin method, develops the latent fingerprints in a manner that makes them difficult to remove from the document. Since this method will be utilized in those cases where the fingerprints are known to be old and in selected cases where the fingerprints are recent, the field in requesting development of latent treatment by the Identification Division should be alert to advise of those situations where permanent staining of the document is inadvisable.

(R) ~~FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT~~ -- The United States Supreme Court handed down an opinion on June 7, 1954, in the case entitled United States v. Robert M. Harriss, et al. The Supreme Court in this decision upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.

Chief Justice Warren in delivering the opinion stated that the application of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act had to be

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limited to "the solicitation, collection or receipt of money or other thing of value" and that "the Government urges a much broader construction, namely that under Title 2, United States Code, Section 264, a person must report his expenditures to influence legislation even though he does not solicit, collect or receive contributions as provided in Section 266 of Title 2, United States Code." The court ruled against such a construction.

The Bureau requested an opinion from the Department in view of the Supreme Court's decision concerning the Department's policy as to investigation under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.

The Department replied and stated in view of this decision that Title 2, United States Code, Section 266, of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act captioned "Persons to Whom Chapter is Applicable" is limited to persons who solicit, collect or receive contributions or money or other thing of value. One of the main purposes of such person or one of the main purposes of such contribution must have been to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress, and the intended method of accomplishing this purpose must have been through direct communication with members of Congress.

The Department advised that under this section investigative efforts should be directed to ascertain: (1) whether or not the person involved solicited, collected or received contributions or money or things of value; (2) if so, whether one of the main purposes of the person so soliciting, collecting or receiving the contribution or whether one of the main purposes of the contribution itself, was to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress, and (3) if the first two conditions prevail, whether the intended method of accomplishing the purpose was by means of direct communication with members of Congress. Such direct pressure may be accomplished either by the lobbyist or through hirelings or by means of an artificially stimulated letter campaign.

The Department advised that under Title 2, United States Code, Section 264 of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act captioned "Statements of Accounts Filed with Clerk of House" that the provisions in Title 2, Section 266, were applicable to this section and thus if investigation develops facts which indicate the person involved is covered by Section 266 further investigation should be conducted

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to ascertain whether or not this person had reported contributions and expenditures as required by Section 264.

Department advised in reference to Title 2, United States Code, Section 267 captioned "Registration of Lobbyist with Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House, Compilation of Information" that by the Supreme Court decision this Section was also limited to persons who are covered by Section 266 of Title 2, but who, in addition, engaged themselves for pay or for any other valuable consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence legislation through direct communication with Congress.

Thus, if investigation develops facts indicating the person is covered by Section 266, further investigation should be conducted to ascertain whether or not that person has engaged himself for pay or other valuable consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence legislation and, if so, whether the attempt to influence is to be accomplished through direct communication with Congress. If the investigation reflects these additional factors are present then it should be ascertained whether or not the person has registered and filed the detailed reports as required by Section 267, Title 2, United States Code.

You are to be guided by the instructions furnished by the Department as to investigation under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act and no investigation should be conducted concerning any person who has not reported expenditures to influence legislation, who has not solicited, collected or received contributions provided under Section 266 of Title 2, United States Code as interpreted by the Harriss decision.

(S) ~~SP~~ SPEECH MATTERS -- I have been gravely concerned by reports that Bureau-approved Special Agent speakers as well as SACs have violated Bureau instructions and have made public pronouncements on the subject of Communism. On a number of occasions, the Bureau's rules against making such statements have been set out. Under no circumstances can a violation of these instructions be countenanced.

As a corollary consideration, I want to reiterate that under no circumstances is any Bureau representative to talk before a group of any size or composition without notifying the Bureau. Any such unauthorized talk based on an understanding that all remarks are "off the record" can only lead to future embarrassment for the Bureau whether or not the subject of Communism enters in.

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If specific questions are asked regarding our investigations of Communist and espionage matters, such queries should be answered as follows: The FBI has been charged by Presidential Directives and Federal statutes with investigating organizations and individuals engaged in subversive activities. It should then be pointed out that it is not possible to discuss this subject matter. It should not be stated that Department of Justice policy precludes discussing the topic of Communism.

I desire to emphasize that this prohibition extends to all aspects of the Communist and Communist espionage fields. No Bureau speaker, no matter how well informed, should attempt to answer questions on the historical development of Communist philosophy. Likewise, this prohibition precludes a Bureau representative from discussing the Rosenberg, Coplon, or any other security investigation. It is true, of course, that the general public on many occasions is familiar with some aspects of our investigations; however, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a Bureau representative to keep in mind what portion of these cases is public knowledge and what portion is restricted. Theories on investigating subversion, the efficacy of Congressional investigating committees, the infiltration of Communists into religious groups, et cetera, are all topics charged with strong political overtones.

These instructions in no way affect or modify prior regulations dealing with closed talks on Communism before law enforcement groups. It is desired that this communication be called to the attention of those Agents assigned to your office who are authorized to make speeches from time to time.

(T) ~~IN~~-SERVICE TRAINING -- The Bureau is currently conducting a self-analysis of its In-Service Training Program and is desirous of securing your views as to the quality of In-Service Training currently afforded. In the event you have any suggestions as to how In-Service Training for Agents can be improved, you should submit an appropriate memorandum to the Bureau, marked for the attention of the Training and Inspection Division, specifying topics which should be added to the In-Service Training Program and the length of each topic, as well as a resume as to what should be presented under that caption, or if you feel that a lecture should be deleted you should specify the exact lecture and why you feel it should be eliminated. You should feel free to be brutally frank in offering your comments regarding In-Service Training. The Bureau is desirous of having your honest, personal appraisal as to the value of In-Service Training

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as it is currently constituted and in this regard you should discuss this matter with certain Agents who you believe will speak freely their views as to the benefits derived from In-Service Training or how greater benefits can be obtained. In this regard contact Agents in grades GS-10, 11 and 12, as well as those in higher grades. Specify when you last attended In-Service Training and add your personal appraisal of the course.

Bear in mind that for reasons of economy the Bureau has found it necessary thus far to limit In-Service Training to the specified eleven days and five hours and this requires, of course, that certain presentations be treated concisely in order to present what has been believed to be a well-rounded course. There is attached for your convenience the program currently presented during the course of In-Service Training so that you may review it. You should make your comments available to the Bureau by Aug. 26, 1954, and you should submit a memorandum even though you may have no suggested changes in mind and that memorandum will nevertheless contain your evaluation of In-Service Training.

(Security Letters on Attached Pages)

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(U) ~~SECURITY INDEX~~ ~~FD-186~~ ~~FBI FORM BOOK~~ -- SAC Letter 54-24(L) dated May 11, 1954, requires that all Security Index subjects must be personally observed in order to aid in the reporting of accurate descriptions and to prevent mistaken identities. It is further provided that a notation or memorandum to the effect that the Security Index subjects have been personally observed shall appear in the case files of all Security Index subjects whose names are presently maintained in the Security Index. In most instances, such notations will already appear in those case files, having been recorded there at the time the Security Index subjects were personally observed by the Special Agents to whom the subjects were assigned for apprehension purposes. Many Security Index subjects have also been observed during direct or pretext interviews, surveillances and on other occasions.

Your attention is directed to Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions, 7b(5)(q), which notes that Form FD-186 has been provided for the purposes of compiling information to be posted on Security Index cards. It was stated that this Form can be filled in by the Agent handling the case by legible hand printing and forwarded to the clerical employee designated to post this information on the reverse side of the Security Index card. After the Security Index card has been prepared at the Bureau and submitted to the field, and the information appearing on the FD-186 has been posted on the reverse side of the geographical Security Index card, this Form is filed in the investigative case file of the subject.

As a result of a suggestion from the field, Form FD-186 is being amended to provide for the recording of the physical observation of Security Index subjects, pursuant to the instructions in the above SAC Letter. The amended Form will also provide for the posting of any additional descriptive data developed as a result of the personal observation of Security Index subjects.

Attached hereto is one copy of the revised Form FD-186 which should be placed in the FBI Form Book maintained by your office. Form FD-186 in its present form should be used until your supply is exhausted.

Appropriate Manual changes will be forwarded to your office at a later date.

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(V) ~~ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS, DOUBLE-AGENT PROGRAM, FULL EXPLOITATION OF ALL KNOWN CONTACTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS, EMPLOYEES AND ESTABLISHMENTS~~ - No Number SAC Letter AF (IV) dated October 22, 1952, and SAC Letters 53-1, 53-41 and 54-32 (Q) have previously been issued with respect to this matter. The Bureau has noted that a number of cases, recently opened [redacted] (Q)u

[redacted] actually involved students in secondary, elementary or high schools who appear to be writing to Soviet establishments in connection with study projects in conjunction with their school work. (Q)u

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It is desired to remind all offices that instructions issued under instant caption in no way abrogate other general instructions relating to investigations in security-type cases and, in particular, there is no abrogation of the instructions contained in Section 87 C, page 24, Manual of Instructions, concerning investigations of students and other individuals connected with the educational field. Where the subject of an investigation [redacted] (Q)u

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[redacted] is determined to be an elementary, secondary or high school student, no further investigation is to be conducted by any field office and the matter is to be closed by advising the Bureau and interested offices by airtel. The Bureau does not desire that any interviews be conducted of elementary, secondary or high school students or with teachers or principals of such schools in investigations of this type. (Q)u

In any unusual situation where other data in the files of a field office indicate some special necessity to conduct further investigation which might be the case where some older high school student is involved, all available data should be summarized in an airtel to the Bureau and specific Bureau authority should be requested prior to conducting any further investigation. (Q)u

The foregoing comments should be immediately brought to the attention of all appropriate supervisory and investigative personnel in your office.

(W) ~~COMMUNIST PARTY-SECURITY-MEASURES~~--- In view of the recent emphasis by the Communist Party in its attempts to secure data regarding the FBI, its employees and techniques, I feel it imperative again to caution all employees to be most alert and security conscious at all times. The Communist Party has used many and devious means to (Q)u

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gather data regarding the FBI. As you have been advised in the past, they have attempted to secure license numbers of Bureau cars, names of FBI Agents appearing as witnesses in court and making public speeches. They have made anonymous telephone calls to various offices attempting to get names or to judge the size of an office. They have engaged in fictitious public polls interviewing people on the street or individuals they think may know something about the FBI. They may ask questions about the FBI in general, if the individual knows any individuals working for the FBI, and so forth. (C) u

It was recently reported in a field office that an individual who was a key figure and a member of the Security Review Commission of the Communist Party had in his possession data regarding a certain FBI employee. This data was rather complete, showing complete description of the employee and family, address, employment, and other background information. It was determined this information was secured by the Communist Party through an insurance agent who was a member of the Communist Party and had sold an insurance policy to the Bureau employee. (C) u

You should specifically bring this matter to the attention of all employees of your office emphasizing the tactics employed by the Communist Party in its effort to secure information concerning the FBI, so that all employees will be ever alert to keep the Communist Party from receiving any information regarding the FBI. (C) u

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachments for (E), (T), & (U)

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perfectly natural; however, it is the responsibility of each current employee to take steps to prevent revealing even in a casual conversation information which would not be released to the public and therefore should not be given to a former employee.

I want you personally to handle this important topic in a presentation to be made at the next conference for investigative employees and at the next conference for noninvestigative employees to be held in your division. You should make certain that employees understand that friendship and an interest in the FBI are not sufficient reasons for removing barriers set up to protect the service and its operations and the confidential nature of our functions.

(L) ~~PERSONNEL~~ ~~CONDUCT~~ ~~DISCIPLINE~~ -- All employees should understand that a program of tight discipline is necessary in the FBI in order to preserve the integrity and reputation of the service. If employees understand that the disciplinary program of the Bureau is set up to protect them, more wholehearted support can be expected and we can reach our aim of having employees discipline themselves. This is an essential in any properly administered plan such as that used by the Bureau, and it is the responsibility of each employee and supervisor to be alert to watch for weaknesses, and when they are discovered use those weaknesses as a means of correcting future operations voluntarily. Of course, this does not intend to serve as a substitute for the present policy of fixing responsibility and taking administrative action where desirable. It is the responsibility of supervisory employees to take the initiative in recommending disciplinary action for inadequate performance, for weaknesses which should have been detected, and for errors made.

It is important that in an organization such as the FBI, where so many elements seek to embarrass, harass, or if possible destroy our organization, we must have effective ways and means for curbing our actions and preventing improprieties of any type. This can best be done by the employees themselves, through imposing rigid self-restrictions. When such restrictions fail, or when employees fall down in the task of disciplining themselves, then obviously supervisors must follow through as a part of the disciplinary program.

It is your responsibility as a Special Agent in Charge to make certain that all employees understand that the disciplinary program of the Bureau is set up for the guidance and protection of everyone in the service and must receive wholehearted support and impartial administration. A great measure of good can be obtained from

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